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There has been much talk about the 
risks to radio networks. How great is 
the actual danger and does criminal 
law protect against assaults on radio 
networks?  
 
Maximillian  Drnseif 
 
is working on his doctorate at the 
professorship for criminal law at the 
University of Bonn on the topic “Legal 
Facts of Computer Crime”  
E-Mail: md@hudora.de 
 
 
Kay H. Schumann 
 
is an articled clerk. He is working on his 
doctorate at the professorship for criminal 
law at the University of Bonn on the topic 
“The Relevance of Electronic Payment 
according to Criminal Law” 
E-Mail: kayschumann@mac.com 
 
 
Christian Klein 
 
is studying computer science at the 
University of Bonn and works as a Junior 
Consultant for c0re GmbH, Bonn. 
E-Mail: ck@c0re.23.nu 
 
 Introduction 
In the past few months there have been 
many articles on the risks of Wave-LANs, 
the wireless computer networks according 
to the IEEE 802.11 standard [1]. The terms 
drive-by-hacking and/or war driving are 
being used. However, so far methodical 
inquests have concentrated on crypto-
graphic problems [2]. In this article we will 
explain the significance of these problems 
in the context of protocol mechanisms and 
make an evaluation of the penal code in 
respect thereof. In addition, we will present 
the results of an assessment of the actual 
situation -- for this purpose we investigated 
the extension and configuration of Wave-
LANs in the Bonn area. 
 1 Problem  
Wireless communication differs from 
cabled communication by the applied 
medium of transmission. Regulating the 
access of data over cable is a relatively 
simple matter: Those with no cable access 
have no admission to the transmitted data 
without a considerable amount of effort.  
The transmission medium for wireless 
communication is radio waves, which are 
broadcast circularly from the transmitter. 
Thereby, the power of reception subsides 
quadratically in relation to the distance 
from the transmitting source. The broadcast 
radius is weaker in urban areas and an 
estimation of propagation is unpredictable.  
Even when propagation is partly con-
trolled by a skilful selection of a private 
“network” of antennas and transmitters, the 
area of coverage does not stop at building 
or property boundaries. In practice this 
often leads to the possibility of regularly 
receiving institutional wireless communi-
cation on public property. 
This problem had been known before 
DECT Standards were introduced in 
connection to mobile telephones. The well-
known case of the bugged telephone 
conversations of the Prince of Wales comes 
to mind.  
Today’s widely popular radio-based 
computer networks (based on IEEE 
802.11b), provide a four times higher risk 
factor than mobile phones: 
♦ 
♦ 
♦ 
♦ 
♦ 
♦ 
♦ 
♦ 
Data in computer networks cover a far 
greater bandwidth of content than 
telephone conversations. 
Because the data is stored electronically 
it is easily saved, filtered and searched. 
Networks have the potential to allow 
access to substantially more information. 
In many cases it is possible to bypass 
firewalls through Wave-LAN and thus 
gain access to a company’s intranet.  
While expensive technology is required 
for listening in on mobile telephone 
conversations, with wireless networks an 
adaptation of the network software is 
sufficient. 
In the case of an unauthorized access to a 
Wave-LAN, various scenarios have to be 
taken into consideration. Here are a few 
examples: 
Internet Use: An unauthorized person 
could use another persons’ access to the 
Internet. This provides him with a high 
degree of anonymity. Besides sparing 
the cost of his – possibly punishable – 
acts, all suspicion will point to the 
person holding the access account. 
Picking up Communication: The 
unauthorized person may pick up 
communication within a wireless 
network and possibly even within the 
company’s intranet.  
“Data Theft”: Through the fact that the 
unauthorized person may access the data 
from “within the network” there is a 
great probability that he/she may read 
data stored within the network that may 
not be retrieved from outside. 
Data Manipulation: An unauthorized 
person may possibly change or modify 
First published in german in Datenschutz und Datensicherheit April 2002   1 
Maximillian Dornseif, Kay H. Schumann, Christian Klein  
saved data or data that is being 
transmitted. 
 2 Technical Basics 
Technology for today’s prevailing wireless 
networks is the Wireless Ethernet in 
accordance to the IEEE standard 802.11b 
(Wave-LAN). These networks as ad-hoc 
networks enable several computers to 
communicate with each other equally, or in 
managed mode, in which a base station 
controls data transfer. We limit our report to 
the managed mode system, because it seems 
to be less complex and – as we will prove – 
more common. 
Furthermore, we will briefly describe the 
technical functionality of Wave-LAN 
networks to form the basis for our legal 
assessment. Concurrently, we will outline 
the arbitrary mistakes published in technical 
literature. 
 2.1 Login 
The base station of a Wave-LAN network 
sends several so-called beacon signals a 
second on an assigned channel. This beacon 
signal contains – besides other information 
on the network – the name (called SSID) 
and the worldwide unique address of the 
network and/or the base station. Because 
the addresses are assigned according to 
type, it is possible to find out the producer 
of the base station by this address. 
Furthermore, the beacon signal contains the 
information of whether encoding was used, 
of which channel was utilized, and of which 
speed it supports. 
Control messages transmitted between 
the base station and a computer contain, 
amongst others: probe request, probe 
response, authentication request and 
authentication response. A computer will 
send a probe request to a specific SSID in 
order to receive information about the 
network. The base station of the relevant 
network will then answer with a probe 
response, which includes about the same 
data as the beacon signal. If no SSID is 
included in the probe request (also called 
broadcast SSID) all base stations will 
answer no matter which SSID they have. 
A base station and thus the relevant 
network may however be configured as  
“hidden”; this is called closed network 
access control, hidden SSID or no 
broadcast SSID. If this set-up is chosen the 
base station will not include the SSID in 
their beacon signals and it will not answer 
to probe request messages to the broadcast 
SSID.  
A try to limit access will fail however, 
because the name of the network will be 
transmitted in numerous control packets and 
may be easily detected by anybody who is 
able to receive data communicated between 
the base station and other computers. 
Before a computer can transmit 
reference data to and from a base station it 
needs to authenticate itself at the base 
station with an authentication request. In 
the case of an open system configuration 
there is basically no authorization protocol. 
In a shared key authentication only those 
computers that own a password for that 
network, will be allowed access. However, 
an error in the protocol design will lead to 
the consequence that anyone, who will 
observe the successful authentication of 
another computer with the base station, will 
be able to simulate such an authentication 
without knowing the password. In this case, 
only two data packets that were recorded 
when another computer was successfully 
authenticated are mathematically linked in 
order to receive new valid authentication 
data [3]. 
Usually base stations offer another 
possibility to limit access and this is called 
MAC Address Control.1 Every network 
interface card in computers has its own 
worldwide unique so-called MAC address. 
The base station administrator may exclude 
specific MAC addresses from access or it 
may limit access to specific MAC 
addresses. However, every user may change 
his or her computer’s MAC address. With 
the help of specific software, he or she 
simply has to change the address of the 
network card to the value of an authorized 
card and thus be allowed access.  To find 
out which addresses are authorized one 
either has to observe the communication or 
by automated trial and error try out all 
possible addresses of a producer. 
 2.2 Transport of Data 
Maximum protection by encoding is 
intended for reference data. The Wave LAN 
Standard defines an encoding protocol 
called WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), 
which is intended to offer the same degree 
of safety to wireless networks that wired 
networks are standardized on. 
                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 MAC: Medium Access Control. 
Without going into technical detail, we 
would like name some of the possible ways 
of attack to the encoded transport of data: 
Calculating the Password: The utilized 
key can be calculated by recording the 
encoded data packet. This key opens the 
possibility to decode the entire recorded 
data as well as allowing the attacker to 
transmit data via the radio network [4]. 
Dictionary Attack: By recording a 
substantial amount of encoded data 
packets, it is possible to decode single 
data packets without having to know the 
password [3]. 
Packet Modification: Bits in data 
packets may be tipped. This allows the 
possibility – as long as the structure or 
content of the encoded data packet is 
known at least in part – to modify 
specific parts of the encoded data 
without knowing the code-key [3]. 
Packet Creation: If the packets’ 
encoded and unencrypted content is 
known – for example, in the case of an 
authentication request and authenti-
cation reply packet – then the ability to 
create an encoded package of any size is 
possible. The created package may be 
converted into any other encoded and 
valid packet [5]. 
Brute Force Attack: Due to errors in 
the creation of code-keys, there is a good 
chance to just guess the password 
through trial and error. Only a few 
minutes of trying are sufficient for the 
implementations of some producers [6]. 
Replay Attack: Attacks have been 
publicized that have made use of the fact 
that WEP encoding of an already 
encoded message will result in a 
decoded message. It possible to record 
an encoded message from the air and 
send it back to the radio network from 
outside via the base station. The base 
station will then try to re-encode it with 
the consequence that it then sends the 
unencrypted data [3]. 
Evil Twin: A second base station with 
the same name but with greater 
transmitting power is installed. Most of 
the clients will now use the second base 
station. If the second base station is 
operated without encryption, the clients 
will often automatically deactivate 
encoding. Thus, the attacker will not 
only have access to unencrypted data, 
but also may falsify data passing his 
base station as he wishes – the so-called 
man-in-the-middle attack – and thus 
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deactivate further security mechanisms, 
where required [7]. 
 3 Methodology 
In order to gain an insight on the spread and 
security configuration of Wave LANs and 
to enable an assessment of the expenditure 
to detect Wave LANs we have conducted a 
measuring campaign. 
We chose the urban area of the city of 
Bonn as our testing area. In order to verify 
and extend the results gained from the Bonn 
area we have conducted sample 
measurements in the Cologne area. 
In the preliminary test we used trade-
name notebooks, Wave LAN cards and 
exclusively the software supplied with it. 
For this preliminary test we chose the area 
around the faculty of law and political 
sciences in Bonn. In the network 
configuration of the two notebooks no 
network was specified. While we walked 
along the streets we researched, we had to 
check if our configuration software 
indicated a network. If so, we noted the 
location and the notebook was removed 
from the transmission range of the network. 
The network name was then reset to 
“unspecified”.  
In the course of this preliminary test we 
were able to register six Wave LAN 
networks in less than one hour. 
To examine the complete urban area of 
Bonn, this method seemed inappropriate, as 
it was too slow and laborious. However, 
there is software on the market, which 
records network information and resets 
network names automatically. The most 
advanced software of this kind for the 
Microsoft Windows operating system is 
Netstumbler, which is available free of 
charge. For operating systems based on 
BSD 4.4lite dstumbler works in a similar 
way.  
Each software carries out basically the 
same operations that were done manually in 
our preliminary test, and via an additional 
external GPS receiver they record the actual 
position. In addition they also record hidden 
SSID networks, which are usually sorted 
out by end user software.  
The software will only passively detect 
the existence and the security configuration 
of a network by means of its control data 
but does not collect any encoded or 
unencrypted reference data. 
In order to cover the entire urban area, 
the measurements were done by car. Our 
tests showed that it was possible to reliably 
detect networks at speeds of up to 65 km/h. 
Since this measurement set-up detected 
only two of the already known Wave LANs, 
we decided on a standard outside cars 
antenna with a performance of 7db – in 
order to counter the screening effect of the 
car body. With this antenna we were able to 
detect four of six known networks. 
M. Dornseif and C. Klein carried out the 
following measuring campaign directly 
after the preliminary experiment from mid-
October until the end of November 2001. In 
order not to disturb the traffic too much we 
regularly conducted our measurement tours 
in the late evenings or early mornings. That 
is why we could only detect networks that 
were also in operation overnight. While we 
do not assume that a significant share of 
base stations will be shut off over night we 
think that ad hoc networks consisting of 
computers only without any base station 
will presumably be switched off at night 
together with their constituent computers. 
We tried to cover the central districts of 
Bonn. In the outlying districts we had to do 
with sampling measurement tours. All in 
all, we did about 20 measurement tours 
covering a total of almost 800 km.  
 4 Measurement 
Results 
We could detect 157 networks in the urban 
Bonn area. Since we could only detect 
about 2/3 of the previously known networks 
with our equipment, we assume that the 
total number of networks (also the ones 
operated during usual business hours) in the 
Bonn area covered by the test run to about 
200. When we made sample measurements 
in Cologne we detected another 125 
networks, which were included in the 
summary. Only 11 (approx. 4 %) of these 
283 networks were ad hoc networks; 78 
networks (approx. 28 %) used WEP coding 
and 59 (approx. 21 %) were hidden (hidden 
SSID).  
This means that more than 50 % of the 
networks detected by us do not use the 
protocol security functions. 
It is remarkable that 58 of the networks 
using hidden SSID (approx. 98 %) had the 
same network operator. 
As we noticed 84 (approx. 30%) of the 
283 networks we detected used the factory 
set names given by the various producers. 
Operators, who will not even change the 
name of their network, will presumably not 
adjust the security settings to their needs. 
 5 Evaluation with 
Respect to  
Criminal Law 
A penal evaluation of the various methods 
of attacks to Wave LANs, which were 
briefed initially, is currently not being 
widely discussed. The main reason for that 
may be that attacks to radio-based computer 
networks would remain mostly undetected. 
Concurrently, there are probably a high 
number of undetected cases of computer 
crime – just like other white-collar crimes. 
Data espionage documented by the police 
for crime statistics, make up only 1% of all 
computer crimes in the year 2000. Indeed, 
in legal practice these attacks do not play a 
very important role.  
 5.1 § 202a StGB (German 
Criminal Code) 
Wave LAN intruders may chose from a 
wide range of legally pertinent computer 
crimes. The relevant regulations of the 
German criminal code are § 202a and § 
303a, b; whereas § 303a and b refer to § 
202a with respect to the subject of the 
attack, which is the data. Thus, § 202a StGb 
represents the legal gate for attacks to radio 
networks. 
This criminal provision has been 
introduced with the 2nd WiKG (Law on 
White-Collar Crime) of 1986 and was 
intended to close legal loopholes in respect 
to punishability, which have occurred at a 
time when the transfer of information has 
increasingly left the path of written 
communication; § 202 StGB, which has 
been created for cases of violations of 
privacy, and which exclusively applies to 
letters and secret documents, does not 
embrace today’s information exchange 
taking place via computer networks. § 202a 
StGB – according to the prevailing yet not 
undisputed opinion – serves the protection 
of the personal spheres of life and secrecy 
as well as the general interest – formalized 
by the requirements for specific safety – in 
keeping data secret that perceivably cannot 
be stored or transferred directly.  
According to the provision, the 
significant act here is that the offender 
obtains data for himself or for a third 
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person, which is not intended for him, and 
which was secured against unauthorized 
access. 
The legislator has legally defined the 
subject of the crime – the data – in the 
second section of this provision. For the 
purpose of this provision: data that was 
stored or transferred electronically, mag-
netically or otherwise directly unperceiv-
able.  This applies to stored data and to that 
being transferred. In the case of an attack to 
a radio network with the purpose of actively 
or passively picking up the data transfer, the 
second alternative – data being transferred – 
applies. If the radio network is used only 
for the purpose of reading data stored on a 
single computer, the first alternative 
applies. 
 5.2 Spying out Stored Data 
The criminally relevant objects of an attack 
when a radio network is invaded for the 
purpose of reading data stored on the 
computers of this network can be made out 
quickly and relevantly defined. Here too, 
however, is the limiting condition, which 
says that this data must be specially secured 
against unauthorized access. It depends on 
whether access barriers within the network 
counter the intrusion, or if there are access 
barriers protecting the data on the 
computers directly.  
Such access barriers on the Wave LAN 
level may exist in hidden SSID, shared key 
or MAC Address Control systems. As 
mentioned above however, it is quite simple 
to bypass these access barriers with simple 
methods by a marginally experienced 
computer user.  
This implies the question whether these 
safety systems actually represent an 
“exceptional security” with respect to the 
body of an offence as stipulated in § 202a 
StGB. In this regard there is a wide range of 
opinions to be found in pertinent literature. 
Some would like to accept a special 
safety measure only if it is objectively 
suited to represent a considerable obstacle 
for very experienced computer experts [9, 
10]. The majority here is of the opinion that 
it should be sufficient only if the 
experienced computer user or a non-
professional expert will face a considerable 
obstacle. Although there has been no visible 
sign of a common pattern yet [11-18]. As 
we stated in our analysis of facts above, it is 
possible to access networks with very 
simple methods even for the non-
professional. With respect to radio networks 
there are no sophisticated and at the same 
time practicable and reliable safety 
measures at present. Therefore, it should be 
sufficient, to use the interested non-
professional as an example. This non-
professional – when facing customary 
access barriers – must intensively grapple 
with the network, may have to calculate 
passwords, or modify its address data. 
Thus, concerning these types of access 
barriers, the network operator should fulfill 
his obligation by providing adequate 
documentation in the interest of secrecy. As 
long as he has done this, he is lawfully 
protected against the retrieval of data from 
his computers. 
 5.3 Spying out of Data 
Being Transferred 
With respect to attacks on data being 
transferred, in this case data that is subject 
to the actual radio transfer, the situation is 
similar. When discussing the issue whether 
the attack on the radio network represents a 
criminal act, one first has to examine 
whether the network operator had the data 
transmission secured physically, e.g. with 
screening measures. If this is the case, one 
can assume that special safety measures 
were made for the purpose of protection 
against a criminal act, and thus the data 
being transferred is lawfully protected.  
If there are no special physical safety 
measures made, one must find out whether 
the operator has chosen the option of 
encoding (WEP). If this is not the case 
punishability according to § 202 StGB is 
fundamentally ruled out regarding the 
attacker because the transferred data had 
not been secured on a regular basis.  
 5.4 Legal Evaluation of 
Encoding 
Looking at the wording of § 202a StGB 
however, the issue arises whether encoding 
can be considered a “special safety measure 
against unauthorized access”, which 
represents an issue that has not been 
ultimately determined as yet in science and 
legislation. 
The legislator indeed intended to protect 
data which are being transmitted by the 
creation of § 202a StGB. In this respect 
there should be no difference between the 
data transmission handled by cable or by 
radio.  
However, if the operator uses data 
encryption, one must observe that the 
encoded data itself may be transmitted 
unencrypted without any further protection. 
The choice of words in § 202a StGB 
however, speaks of data that has been 
expressly secured against unauthorized 
access. However, the encoding itself merely 
creates new data, which must be 
transmitted. The original data, which is the 
subject of the encoding, continue to exist in 
their original form but are independent from 
the now self-contained transmission data 
being transferred. Possible attacks on the 
radio network will, however, aim at just 
these (encoded) data. Subject of this 
regulation in § 202a StGB are all data, 
which are subject to an interest to be kept 
secret. So with respect to the punishability, 
it does not make any difference whether a 
plain text message or an inextricable 
“mishmash” (of encoded data) is the target 
of the attack.  
So we must take a look at the encoded 
data and not at the prototypes – the original 
data – standing somewhere in the 
background. Subsequently, if we now 
rightly comprehend the relevant transmis-
sion data as independent data, we will find 
it completely possible to just grab at some 
wholly unprotected data “out of the air”. 
In law literature regarding § 202a StGB, 
encoding is nevertheless regarded as a 
special safety measure [8, 15, 16, 20]. Some 
people say that having access to encoded 
data cannot be regarded as an access to the 
original data [16]. This is indeed correct, 
but is insignificant in our opinion due to the 
fact that the object of the attack is the 
specific encoded data alone.  
Furthermore, in relevant literature there 
is dialogue about the sense and purpose of 
the standard. An access barrier for the 
purpose of the prevention of a criminal 
offence serves the purpose to protect the 
formal interest of secrecy. In the case of 
data transmission this may only be reached 
by encoding. Therefore, this law must be 
construed in a way that encoding as well 
must be understood as a means of security 
considering the crime [16]. Other authors 
reach the same conclusion with similar 
arguments. They all have one thing in 
common – is and when this issue is 
considered at all – that they mainly speak 
about the original data and that they don’t 
assign the encoded data their own quality as 
the object of the criminal offence. 
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Only a few of them reject a special 
security for the purpose of § 202a StGB 
with respect to the transmission of encoded 
data [21]. In respect to the represented view 
here, that original data and encoded data 
being the same is not appropriate, we agree 
with their conclusion. 
So it shows that – when § 202a StGB is 
evaluated correctly and dogmatically – 
encoded data generally are not lawfully 
protected.  
We will have to wait and see which 
direction legal practice in the future will go 
regarding attacks on radio networks. We 
fear that the courts will follow prevailing 
opinion and have the picking up of encoded 
data ruled by § 202a StGB. But this would 
be sooner supported by result-oriented 
considerations, because if you take a closer 
look at the wording of § 202a StGB you 
will find uncomfortable loopholes regarding 
the punishability. 
6 Conclusion 
We have proven that it is impossible to 
operate an attack-proof Wave LAN with the 
systems currently available on the mass 
market. 
We have proven further that Wave LANs 
are considerably widespread with the 
majority seeming to be operated without 
any encoding or other means of security.  
Finally, we have stated that operators of 
unprotected Wave LANs may in practice 
not expect any protection against the spying 
out of his data from the criminal courts and 
that they have only very little protection 
against active attacks to their networks. 
Even in the case of networks using 
encoding, the situation with respect to the 
criminal law is dogmatic and highly 
unsatisfactory if their data is spied out. On 
the contrary, the law fundamentally protects 
against active attacks as long as the interest 
in secrecy is documented. This 
documentation function may be fulfilled by 
any of the Wave LAN security mechanisms.  
Since there are sufficient publications 
stating that Wave LANs are unsafe, the user 
of a Wave LAN should reckon to be 
accused himself if his data fall into the 
wrong hands via a Wave LAN system. 
In conclusion, one must advise every 
Wave LAN user, who transmits data that 
is worth being protected, to seriously 
consider following the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and do 
without the use of Wave LAN use for 
reasons of security. 
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